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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 








VIRGIN ISLANDS WATER AND POWER AUTHORITY; 
JAMES BROWN; JOHN DOE I; JOHN DOE II; 
JOHN DOE III; JOHN DOE IV 
 
       Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority; 
       James Brown; Randolph Harley, 
 
       Appellants 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
 
(District Court No. 96-cv-00048) 
District Court Judge: Thomas K. Moore 
 
Argued: December 5, 2000 
 
Before: MANSMANN, ALITO, Circuit Judges, and 
ACKERMAN, Senior District Judge1  
 





1. Honorable Harold A. Ackerman, Senior Judge of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. 
  
       SAMUEL H. HALL, JR. (argued) 
       MARIE E. THOMAS 
       Birch de Jongh Hindels & Hall 
       Poinsettia House at Bluebeard's 
        Castle 
       No. 1330 Estate Taarnebjerg 
       St. Thomas, V.I. 00802 
 
       Counsel for Appellant 
 
       JAMES M. DERR (argued) 
       28-29 Norre Gade 
       P.O. Box 664 
       St. Thomas, V.I. 00804 
 
       Counsel for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
This is an appeal from a District Court or der denying a 
motion for summary judgment by the defendants in an 
action asserting a constitutional tort claim. The defendants 
raised the defense of qualified immunity, but the District 
Court rejected that defense, primarily on the ground that it 
had been waived because it was not asserted until 





Plaintiff Gabrielle Eddy was employed by the V irgin 
Islands Water and Power Authority ("W APA") as a lineman. 
The parties disagree about the extent of his training and 
whether he was trained to perform work at WAPA's facility 
at Krum Bay, St. Thomas, the location of the accident that 
led to this lawsuit. 
 
On June 2, 1994, a switch on a high voltage line needed 
to be replaced. A determination was made that the work 
would be done without shutting off the power . Defendant 
James Brown, the acting Superintendent of the Line 
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Department, instructed Eddy to perform the work. Eddy 
claims that he informed Brown that he was unqualified to 
do the work but that Brown told him that he would be 
subject to discipline and possible termination if he refused. 
According to Eddy, WAPA pr ovided him with improper 
clothing, tools, and equipment to perfor m this work on a 
live line. Among other problems, Eddy asserts that he was 
required to use an ordinary metal ratchet wrench (as 
opposed to the insulated wrenches normally used for these 
procedures) and was forced to wear a polyester uniform 
(instead of the 100% cotton clothing requir ed under OSHA 
regulations). During the switch replacement, Eddy's wrench 
slipped, passed in the vicinity of an electric insulator and, 
as Eddy characterizes it in his brief, he was engulfed in a 
fireball. After this incident, WAP A fired Eddy, and OSHA 
cited WAPA for a number of violations. 
 
Eddy commenced this action against WAP A and several 
named and unnamed individuals. In addition to thr ee tort 
claims under Virgin Islands law, Eddy asserted a claim 
based directly on the Fourteenth Amendment and a claim 
under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. Eddy voluntarily dismissed two of 
the three territorial law claims, and the r emaining 
territorial law claim is not before us in this appeal. In 
addition, the District Court dismissed the claim based 
directly on the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that it was 
"duplicative of " the section 1983 claim, and that dismissal 
is likewise not before us now. 
 
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the 
section 1983 claim, but the District Court denied their 
motion. The Court held that "Eddy clearly has established 
that material facts remain in dispute concer ning whether 
the individual defendants' actions were so outrageous that 
they `shock the conscience' of [the] Court." July 20, 1999 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 6-7. The District Court rejected the 
defendants' defense of qualified immunity because they "did 
not raise this affirmative defense untilfiling this motion for 
summary judgment, approximately eighteen months after 
this case began." Id. at 7. The Court interpreted dictum in 
a footnote in an opinion of this Court to mean that"failure 
to include qualified immunity in [the] answer to [the] 
complaint results in the involuntary waiver of this 
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affirmative defense." Id. (citing Frett v. Government of the 
Virgin Islands, 839 F.2d 968, 973 n.1 (3d Cir. 1988)). The 
District Court went on to provide two alter native bases for 
rejecting the defense of qualified immunity. The Court 
concluded that the defendants had failed to show that their 
challenged actions were "discretionary" rather than 
ministerial, id. at 7 n.2, and that "it is a proper question for 
the jury to determine if defendants knew or r easonably 
should have known that their conduct would subject them 




The appellants invoke our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291, which authorizes us to hear appeals fr om "final 
decisions" of the District Court of the V irgin Islands. The 
order in question here is not a "final" order in the usual 
sense, but certain collateral orders ar e considered to be 
final orders and thus are immediately appealable. To 
qualify under the collateral order doctrine, an order must 
(1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve 
an important issue completely separate from the merits of 
the action, and (3) be effectively unr eviewable on appeal 
from a final judgment. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 
310 (1995); In re Montgomery County, 215 F.3d 367, 373 
(3d Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has r ecognized that an 
order rejecting a qualified immunity defense at the 
summary judgment stage may be immediately appealable, 
see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985), but "only 
to the extent the denial turns on an issue of law." In re 
Montgomery County, 215 F.3d at 373 (citing Johnson v. 
Jones, 515 U.S. at 313); Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 
116, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1996) ("To the extent they turn on an 
issue of law, decisions denying public officials qualified 
immunity are considered final under the collateral order 
doctrine."). If we have jurisdiction to r eview an order 
rejecting qualified immunity at the summary judgment 
stage, our review of the order is plenary. See, e.g., Acierno 
v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 609 (3d Cir . 1994). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Only named individual defendants James Br own and Randolph Harley 
seek relief on appeal. See Appellants' Br. at 42. 
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Under the qualified immunity defense, "gover nment 
officials performing discretionary functions generally are 
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 
(1982). In determining whether qualified immunity applies 
in a specific case, we "first determine whether the plaintiff 
has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right 
at all." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); see also 
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991); Torres v. United 
States, 200 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1999); Giuffre v. Bissell, 
31 F.3d 1241, 1247, 1255 (3d Cir. 1994). "[I]f so, [we] 
proceed to determine whether that right was clearly 
established at the time of the alleged violation." Wilson, 526 
U.S. at 609 (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 
(1999)). 
 
"A right is clearly established if its outlines are 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would 
understand that his actions violate the right." Sterling v. 
Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 193 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Moreover, "in the light of pr e-existing law the unlawfulness 
must be apparent." Anderson v. Cr eighton, 483 U.S. 635, 
640 (1987). A right may be clearly established, however, 
even if there is no "previous pr ecedent directly in point." 
Good v. Dauphin County Soc. Servs. for Childr en & Youth, 
891 F.2d 1087, 1092 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Assaf v. Field, 
178 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 1999)."The ultimate issue is 
whether . . . reasonable officials in the defendants' position 
at the relevant time could have believed, in light of what 
was in the decided case law, that their conduct would be 




With these principles in mind, we tur n to the specific 
issues before us in this appeal. The first issue that we must 
address is the correctness of the District Court's holding 
that the individual defendants waived the defense of 
qualified immunity by failing to raise the defense until they 
submitted their motion for summary judgment. This is an 
issue of law over which we have jurisdiction under the 
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collateral order doctrine, and we hold that the District 
Court failed to apply the proper standar d for determining 
whether a waiver occurred. 
 
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, see Karnes 
v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 491 (3d Cir . 1995), and therefore 
under Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pr ocedure it 
should be asserted in the appropriate r esponsive pleading. 
But under established circuit law, the failur e to do so does 
not automatically result in a waiver. Charpentier v. Godsil, 
937 F.2d 859, 863 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Pro v. Donatucci, 
81 F.3d 1283, 1286 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996); Kleinknecht v. 
Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1373 (3d Cir. 1993). As 
we have stated 
 
       Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), a responsive pleading may be 
       amended at any time by leave of court to include an 
       affirmative defense, and "leave shall be freely given 
       when justice so requires." Unless the opposing party 
       will be prejudiced, leave to amend should generally be 
       allowed. Moreover, under Fed.R.Civ.P . 15(c), issues 
       tried by the express or implied consent of the parties 
       are "treated in all respects as if they had been raised 
       in the pleadings." It has been held that a "defendant 
       does not waive an affirmative defense if`[h]e raised the 
       issue at a pragmatically sufficient time, and[the 
       plaintiff] was not prejudiced in its ability to respond.' " 
 
Charpentier, 937 F.2d at 863-64 (internal citations omitted). 
Thus, "[e]ven though a motion for summary judgment is not 
the most appropriate way to raise a previously unpled 
defense of immunity," Kleinknecht, 989 F .2d at 1374, in 
cases in which the plaintiff was not pr ejudiced, we have 
held that there was no waiver. See id.; Charpentier, 937 
F.2d at 863-64. 
 
It is true that the opinion in Frett, on which the District 
Court apparently relied, stated that the failure of an answer 
to set forth an affirmative defense "r esults in the 
involuntary waiver of [the] defense[ ] and [its] exclusion 
from the case," 839 F.2d at 973 n.1, but this statement, 
which in any event is plainly dictum, does not addr ess the 
possibility of a late amendment of the answer with leave of 
court. 
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We recognize the dilemma that courts face when 
defendants fail to raise the defense of qualified immunity at 
an early stage of the litigation. On the one hand, permitting 
the defense to be raised at an advanced stage of the case 
may waste time and cause prejudice to the opposing side. 
See Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 98 F .3d 664, 667 (1st 
Cir. 1996) (expressing concerns about witnesses becoming 
unavailable, memories fading, attorneys fees accumulating, 
and imposing additional costs on the court system). 
Accordingly, it has been held that a "trial court has 
discretion to find a waiver if a defendant fails to assert the 
defense within the time limits set by the court or if the 
court otherwise finds that a defendant has failed to exercise 
due diligence or has asserted the defense for dilatory 
purposes." English v. Dyke, 23 F.3d 1086, 1090 (6th Cir. 
1994). The First Circuit has taken a similar approach. See 
Guzman-Rivera, 98 F.3d at 668. On the other hand, an 
overly strict waiver rule may undermine the qualified 
immunity defense, which serves important public purposes. 
See English, 23 F.3d at 1089. As the First Circuit has 
written, "[b]ecause the doctrine of qualified immunity 
recognizes that litigation is costly to defendants, officials 
may plead the defense at various stages in the pr oceedings."3 
Guzman-Rivera, 98 F.3d at 667. 
 
We agree with the conclusions of the First and Sixth 
Circuits that the defense of qualified immunity is not 
necessarily waived by a defendant who fails to raise it until 
the summary judgment stage. Instead, the District Court 
must exercise its discretion and deter mine whether there 
was a reasonable modicum of diligence in raising the 
defense. The District Court must also consider whether the 
plaintiff has been prejudiced by the delay. 
 
In view of the circuit precedent noted above, we must 
reverse the decision of the District Court and remand for a 
more detailed inquiry regarding the issue of waiver. In 
particular, the Court must inquire whether the defendants 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. For example, qualified immunity may be raised in a motion to dismiss 
at the pleading stage, in a motion for summary judgment after discovery, 
or as an affirmative defense at trial. See Guzman-Rivera, 98 F.3d at 667; 
English, 23 F.3d at 1089. 
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violated any scheduling orders in raising the defense for the 
first time in their summary judgment motions, whether 
they delayed asserting the defense for tactical purposes or 
any improper reason, and, most important, whether the 
delay prejudiced the plaintiff 's case. With respect to this 
last factor, we note that Eddy, in his opposition to the 
summary judgment motion, failed to argue that he was 
prejudiced in any specific way by the delay. See Plaintiff 's 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Appendix at 344-47. However, Eddy may be able to make a 
showing of specific prejudice on remand, and thus we leave 
it for the District Court, in the first instance, to decide 






We now turn to the District Court's alternative grounds 
for rejecting the defendants' claim of qualified immunity. As 
previous noted, the Court stated in a footnote that this 
defense would fail even if the defendants had not waived it, 
because they failed to show that their actions wer e taken 
within the scope of their discretionary authority. See July 
20, 1999 Dist. Ct. Op. at 7 n.2. The Court went on to 
observe that Eddy had "produced substantial evidence 
demonstrating that Brown's actions follow a long-standing 
policy and pattern of intimidating and coer cing employees 
to engage in unsafe work practices." Id. And the Court 
added that "[t]his counters defendants' ar guments that 
their actions were discretionary." Id. 
 
The Supreme Court has stated that qualified immunity 
applies to "government officials per forming discretionary 
functions," Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, but the definition of a 
discretionary function is broad. "A law that fails to specify 
the precise action that the official must take in each 
instance creates only discretionary authority; and that 
authority remains discretionary however egregiously it is 
abused." Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196 n.14 (1984); 
see also Sellers v. Baer, 28 F.3d 895, 902 (8th Cir. 1994) 
("For qualified immunity purposes, a duty is`ministerial' 
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only where the statute or regulation leaves no room for 
discretion."). Cf. Varronev. Bilotti, 123 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 
1997) (noting that the continued validity of the ministerial 
duty exception has been questioned and that, in any event, 
it is "extremely narrow"); Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2, 11 (1st 
Cir. 1993) (same). 
 
The correctness of the District Court's interpr etation of 
the scope of the ministerial duty exception is a question of 
law that we may reach in a collateral or der appeal, and we 
conclude that the District Court's understanding was 
mistaken. Even if WAPA had a "long-standing policy and 
pattern of intimidating and coercing employees to engage in 
unsafe work practices," July 20 Dist. Ct. Op. at 7 n.2, that 
does not mean that WAPA "specif[ied] the precise action," 
Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. at 196 n.14, that the individual 
defendants took in this case, and thus it does not follow 
that their actions were ministerial. Accor dingly, the 
rejection of the qualified immunity defense may not be 




The District Court's final ground for r ejecting the claim of 
qualified immunity, as we understand it, was that the 
constitutional right that Eddy asserted -- the substantive 
due process right to be free from conduct by a 
governmental employer4 that shocks the conscience -- was 
clearly established at the time in question and that, without 
a trial, it could not be determined whether the defendants' 
conduct was outrageous enough to reach this level. The 
District Court's holding may be separated into legal and 
factual components. The legal component, which we may 
reach in this appeal, includes two questions: (a) whether 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Under the Revised Organic Act, 48 U.S.C.S 1561, the Due Process 
Clause applies to the Government of the V irgin Islands. "Thus, the 
Organic Act requires the same due pr ocess analysis that would be 
utilized under the federal constitution." Hendrickson v. Reg O Co., 657 
F.2d 9, 14 n.2 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 
In this case, the District Court held that W APA and the individual 
defendants, who are WAPA employees, are territorial actors. This issue is 
not before us in this appeal. 
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Eddy has alleged a substantive due process violation at all 
and (b) whether the right asserted was clearly established. 
The factual component is the question whether ther e are 
genuine issues regarding facts that ar e material to the 
determination of whether the defendants' conduct was 
sufficient to shock the conscience. Under Johnson v. Jones, 
supra, this is a question of evidentiary sufficiency that we 
may not address in this appeal.5 
 
With respect to the first of the legal issues, the 
defendants contend that the substantive due pr ocess right 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The defendants have not argued that the District Court's decision is 
based on an incorrect interpretation of the intent necessary to support 
a substantive due process claim of the type that Eddy asserts. In County 
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998), the Supreme Court 
stated that "[w]hether the point of conscience shocking is reached when 
injuries are produced [by something] falling within the middle range" 
between negligence and intentional conduct depends on the 
circumstances of the case and in particular on whether the defendant 
had the opportunity to deliberate before engaging in the challenged 
conduct. Here, the District Court, in denying summary judgment, 
appears to have concluded that the summary judgment record was 
sufficient to show that the defendants knew that Eddy " `would face a 
risk of almost certain injury if he perfor med the work.' " July 20, 1999 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 3 (quoting Feb. 5, 1997 Dist. Ct. Op. at 10). The 
defendants have not argued on appeal that this was the wrong legal 
standard. Instead, they dispute the District Court's evaluation of the 
facts in the summary judgment record. Under Johnson v. Jones, supra, 
a factual decision of this nature is not r eviewable under the collateral 
order doctrine. 
 
We are also barred from r eaching the defendants' argument that the 
District Court's opinion reveals no factual basis for denying the 
summary judgment motion of defendant Harley. The question whether 
there is sufficient evidence in the summary judgment record to hold 
Harley in the case is precisely the sort of question that we may not 
entertain in a collateral order appeal. In Johnson v. Jones, supra, three 
police officers whom the plaintiff alleged had beaten him argued that the 
District Court had erroneously denied their summary judgment requests 
because "whatever evidence [the plaintif f] might have about [two other 
officers], he could point to no evidence that these three had beaten him 
or had been present while others did so." 515 U.S. at 307 (emphasis in 
original). The Supreme Court held that this ar gument concerned a 
question of evidence sufficiency that was not r eviewable in a collateral 
order appeal. 
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to be free from treatment that shocks the conscience does 
not apply to a governmental employer's tr eatment of its 
employees. As the defendants put it, "the Plaintiff simply 
cannot raise the `shocks the conscience' test in an 
employment relationship context." Appellants' Br. at 14. In 
making this argument the defendants rely primarily on 
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992), and 
McClary v. O'Hare, 786 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1986), but we 
believe that the defendants misunderstand those decisions. 
 
In Collins, the widow of a municipal employee who was 
killed in an accident on the job sued the city for which he 
had worked under Section 1983, claiming that the city had 
violated the Due Process Clause. As we explained in our en 
banc decision in Fagan v. City of Vineland , 22 F.3d 1296, 
1304 (3d Cir. 1994), the plaintiff in Collins "advanced two 
theories of recovery": first, " `that the Federal Constitution 
impose[d] a duty on the city to provide its employees with 
minimal level of safety and security in the workplace' " and, 
second, " `that the city's "deliberate indifference" to [the 
deceased's] safety was arbitrary Government action that 
must "shock the conscience" of federal judges.' " Id. 
(quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 126). After r ejecting the first 
theory, the Supreme Court turned to the"shocks the 
conscience" theory and stated: 
 
       We also are not persuaded that the city's alleged failure 
       to train its employees, or to warn them about known 
       risks of harm, was an omission that can pr operly be 
       characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a 
       constitutional sense. Petitioner's claim is analogous to 
       a fairly typical state-law tort claim: The city br eached 
       its duty of care to her husband by failing to provide a 
       safe work environment. Because the Due Pr ocess 
       Clause "does not purport to supplant traditional tort 
       law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability 
       for injuries that attend living together in society," . . . 
       we have previously rejected claims that the Due 
       Process Clause should be interpreted to impose federal 
       duties that are analogous to those traditionally 
       imposed by state tort law . . . . [This] r easoning . . . 
       applies with special force to claims asserted against 
       public employers because state law, rather than the 
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       Federal Constitution, generally governs the substance 
       of the employment relationship. . . . 
 
Collins, 503 U.S. at 128. 
 
Unlike the defendants, we do not read this passage or 
anything else in Collins to mean that the plaintiff in that 
case would not have stated a substantive due pr ocess claim 
if she had alleged conduct on the part of the city that 
satisfied the demanding shocks the conscience test. Rather, 
we understand Collins to mean that the allegations in that 
case did not rise to the conscience-shocking level and that 
the Due Process Clause does not reach a public employer's 
ordinary breach of its duty of car e relative to its employees. 
See Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1304 (noting that Collins 
"unanimously reaffirmed the viability of the `shocks the 
conscience' standard"). Although the Second Circuit's 
opinion in McClary is less clear, we view it as consistent 
with our interpretation of Collins. See 786 F.2d at 89 & n.6. 
We thus reject the argument that, because of Eddy's 
employment relationship with WAP A, he has not alleged a 
violation of the Due Process Clause. 
 
In light of our en banc decision in Fagan, we must also 
reject the argument that the right that Eddy asserts was 
not clearly established at the time of his injury. As noted, 
in Fagan, we interpreted Collins , a case involving a 
workplace accident, as "unanimously reaffirm[ing] the 
viability of the `shocks the conscience' standar d." 22 F.3d at 
1304. Cf. County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 833 
(1998) (holding, after the events at issue her e, that 
executive action violates substantive due pr ocess if it 
shocks the conscience). In reaching this conclusion, we do 
not rely, as the District Court did, on r egulations issued by 
the Occupational Health and Safety Administration. Eddy is 
asserting a claim against the individual defendants for 
violating the Due Process Clause,6  and the defendants "do 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Eddy's brief makes it clear that his Section 1983 claim asserts a 
constitutional violation, not a violation of the OSH Act or OSHA 
regulations. See Appellee's Br. at 20. Therefore, we need not and do not 
decide whether a plaintiff may state a claim under section 1983 for a 
violation of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. S 651 et seq. or regulations issued 
thereunder. See Minichello v. U.S. Industries, 756 F.2d 26 (6th Cir. 1985) 
(OSHA regulations not relevant to civil liability). 
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not forfeit their immunity [with respect to that 
constitutional claim] by violating some other statute or 
regulation." Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. at 194 n.12. We also 
do not rely on the "state created danger" theory of 
substantive due process liability, see Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 
1199 (3d Cir. 1996), as Eddy has to some degr ee on appeal.7 
 
       In summary, we hold as follows. We reverse the decision 
of the District Court insofar as it holds that the individual 
defendants waived the defense of qualified immunity. On 
remand, the District Court must reconsider this question 
under the standards set out in our case law. If the District 
Court concludes that the defense has not been waived 
under these standards, the individual defendants may 
assert that defense at trial. 
 
       We reverse the decision of the District Court insofar as it 
holds that the individual defendants may not assert the 
defense of qualified immunity because their conduct was 
not discretionary. As we have explained, this holding was 
apparently based on a mistaken interpretation of the 
ministerial exception to the defense. On remand, the 
District Court may reconsider the applicability of the 
exception under the correct standard. 
 
       We affirm the District Court's decision denying summary 
judgment on qualified immunity grounds because Eddy has 
alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional 
right. We dismiss the appeal insofar as it contests the 
sufficiency of the evidence to show that the conduct of 




7. We do not reach the question whether, as Eddy has argued on appeal, 
the District Court erred in holding that Eddy cannot sue WAPA itself and 
cannot sue the individual defendants in their official capacities under 42 
U.S.C. S 1983. This question is not within the scope of our limited 
jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. 
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MANSMANN, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I join in the Court's decision to affirm the District Court's 
denial of summary judgment on the ground that an 
employee's constitutional right to be free fr om "arbitrary, or 
conscience shocking" injurious conduct by a state 
instrumentality was clearly established at the time of Mr. 
Eddy's injury. I write separately because my analysis 
diverges from that of my colleagues in two respects. 
 
First, as a technical matter, I would not characterize this 
Court's judgment as a reversal in part, notwithstanding our 
rejection of some of the alternative gr ounds upon which the 
District Court relied. The Order under r eview denied 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. This Court 
today upholds that denial. I would characterize this result 
as an affirmance on an alternate gr ound. For the same 
reason, I would award costs to Eddy, as the prevailing party 
on appeal. 
 
Second, while I agree with the majority that the 
defendants' failure to raise the affir mative defense of 
qualified immunity prior to the summary judgment stage 
does not automatically result in a waiver , it appears that 
the District Court may have based its finding of waiver on 
appropriate discretionary factors such as lack of diligence 
and resulting prejudice,1 rather than on the per se rule 
properly rejected by the majority. The matter is of little 
moment at this stage in view of our affirmance on other 
grounds. If the District Court's decision was predicated on 
consideration of the appropriate factors, then it should 
more clearly articulate its reasoning on r emand. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Cf. Yates v. City of Cleveland, 941 F.2d 444, 449 (6th Cir. 1991) 
(observing that during interval between filing of complaint and delayed 
assertion of defense, plaintiff "engaged in extensive discovery and 
invested, one would imagine, a considerable amount in time, money and 
energy"). 
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